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LOGIC, LIBERALISM AND THE CONVENTION OF 1938:
PHILIP HALPERN'S ROLE
N the summer of 1938 when Philip Halpern sat as a delegate from Erie
County at the last New York Constitutional Convention, he was 35 years
old. He was then a professor at the Buffalo Law.School and a member of the
law firm of Halpern and Friedman; but to a majority of the delegates who came
together for the first time in April of that year, he was quite unknown.
The high reputation in law and in public affairs which he was to carve
out for himself lay in the years ahead. A significant part of that reputation,
however, was made in the Convention in the five months it sat from April to
August of 1938.
To see in perspective the work of the 1938 Convention as a whole and
the contribution of any individual delegate to that work, it is useful to look
for a moment at its membership and its period.
There was a feeling within the Convention itself, shared by the press and by
the public, that nothing it did would be acceptable to the people and no consti-
tutional change would emerge from its deliberations. In part this feeling was
based on the rejection in its entirety of the work of the last previous Convention
in 1915 by the people in the election of that year. To everyone's surprise, not
least to the delegates themselves, the main body of the work of the 1938 Con-
vention was adopted at the general election (1,521,036 to 1,301,797) although
some separately submitted changes, notably a proposed judiciary article were
rejected.
Thus, for the first time since the revision of 1894, there was a general
overhauling of the Constitution and there has been none since. Although the
delegates looked at it differently as they attended its sessions, it must, in historical
perspective, be regarded as one of the three effective New York Constitutional
Conventions since the 1821 Constitution.
1
It sat in time of profound change and disturbance in the world, repercus-
sions of which were felt within the Convention itself. There was then in progress
in Europe the rapid extension of the totalitarian oppressive power of Hitler
with complete deprivation of rights of individuals and the loss of all constitu-
tional rights; there was on the other hand in this country an expanding concept
of welfare and new views about the areas in which democratic government owed
affirmative obligation to the underprivileged and disabled citizen.
Hitler in 1938 had annexed Austria to the German Reich; the outbreak
of World War II was to occur the following year; the Spanish Civil War was
still in -the balance; Franklin D. Roosevelt had been President for a little over
five years; a counter-swing of articulate opinion against a greatly expanded
governmental role, implicit in Roosevelt's program of economic recovery, was
manifest in many fields. There were resulting sharp divisions of strongly held
1. 1847, 1894, 1938.
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opinion on the philosophy of a welfare program which reflected themselves in
the Convention.
There was, it is fair to say, deeply-seated apprehensions both about the
future of individual freedom and the future of free enterprise. The same concern,
however, was in general not shared by the same groups. At several points in
the proceedings of the Convention at which issue was joined on these large
questions, Halpern, whose views were certainly then clearly thought out and
firmly espoused, was to play a significant part.
A study in considerable detail was made of the constitutency and work of
the Convention for the Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and
Political Science five years after it adjourned. 2 A majority of the delegates elected
in the Fall of 1937 were Republicans (90 to 70), and the Convention was organ-
ized by the majority on a traditional legislative basis in the election of the
President and officers and the appointment of Convention membership in the
approximate ratio of the party representation in the body.3
But except in very rare instances where important party policy was involved
the Convention consistently refused to follow regular party leadership. It voted
according to its views on economic, social and legal issues, and repeatedly dis-
regarded the suggestions of the Convention leaders of both parties, and the
division most characteristic of its proceedings was between liberals and conserva-
tives. On the whole, the conservatives were in the majority when feeling on
sensitive issues was strong enough to cause their components in both parties to
coalesce.
But a fair amount of the work of the Convention was quite liberal. It
enacted a public housing article, for example. Halpern was in the forefront of
liberal thought and action in the Convention and made himself one of the
conspicuous figures in this group. His outstanding contribution to the work
of the Convention--one that left its impress in the memory of the delegates
and is reflected repeatedly in the record of proceedings-was to bring to bear
on its work a carefully trained and thoroughly disciplined legal mind.
He was, par excellence, the fully-rounded lawyer of the Convention. Again
and again in debate on legal questions, and most debates turned on legal issues,
he employed to the full the techniques of the lawyer upon argument; the balance,
the reference to historical development, the citation of authority, the steps taken
by law in the past and its path in the future. All this was guided by a keen
insight into the legal values involved.
It is remarkable that he was able to win a full and contemporaneous recog-
nition of this ability in a Convention so heavily weighted, as this one was, with
judges ind lawyers. "You know more about this than I do", remarked Henry
2. O'Rourke & Campbell, Constitution-Making in a Democracy, Theory and Practice
in New York State (1943).
3. For a comprehensive analysis of the political background of the delegates, see
O'Rourke & Campbell, op. cit. supra note 1, ch. 111.
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Hirschberg one day, addressing Halpern.4 It was typical of a viewpoint toward
him. The particular question was on a proposal to prevent the suspension of
the power of grand juries to inquire into misconduct in public office. Hirschberg
was district attorney of Orange County and surely one of the most articulate
lawyers in the Convention. To this compliment Halpern returned a typical
disavowal.
The impression Halpern made on the delegates by sheer lawyer-capacity
is especially significant when it is recalled that at least two-thirds of the members
of the Convention were lawyers and twenty-six delegates were then judges-two
from the Court of Appeals, including Chief Judge Frederick E. Crane, who
was elected Convention president, four Appellate Division justices, including
three of the four presiding justices,5 seven Supreme Court trial justices, and
nine judges from other courts. Many of the lawyer members were of high pro-
fessional standing with long and successful records at the bar.
An issue rather typical of the spirit and tone of the Convention arose over
a restriction sought to be imposed on a proposed search and seizure provision
of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution (Article I). The basic proposal was
to authorize wire tapping by court order on showing probable cause which
became section 12 of Article I. The debated issue was whether there should
be a proviso, as proposed by an amendment by Mr. Dunnigan, that "evidence
obtained in violation of this section shall not be received in any hearing, trial
or proceeding." 6
For over 150 pages of the printed record this was debated. Its opponents
suggested that it would become a refuge and protection for criminals; that a
mere "rule of evidence" did not belong in the Constitution; that it would accom-
plish a radical undoing of a settled rule of law in New York that even if evidence
were unlawfully obtained this would not affect its admissibility.
The debate was impassioned on both sides and at times heavily surcharged
with emotion. Halpern spoke toward the end of the discussion in favor of the
restriction on admissibility; and although the proposal of restriction was in the
end defeated, his address marks one of the high points of legal synthesis and
logic in the proceedings of the Convention. It placed in close legal perspective
what had been over several days a discursive and tumultous argument.
He opened with an explanation that he was leaving his own political
colleagues in supporting the restriction on admissibility: "I owe it to my many
colleagues whom I am leaving on this occasion ... to give a word of explanation
for my support of this proposal ...I speak on this subject with all sincerity
that I can command, because I hope to persuade a few of my colleagues to vote
as I intend to vote in favor of the Dunnigan proposal."
7
4. Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of the State of New York, pp.
2572-73 (1938) [hereinafter cited as "Record"].
5. O'Rourke & Campbell, op. cit. supra note 1, at 83.
6. Record, pp. 406-07.
7. Id. at 546.
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He plunged at once into the "rule of evidence" argument that had been
made against the proposal:
. . . The argument is made that this proposal should not go into the
Constitution because it is a rule of evidence.
: .. I think when this provision is analyzed it will be found that it
is not a rule of evidence at all. It is unfortunate that the word
Cevidence" was used in the language of the bill, but it could be stated
just as easily without any reference to the rules of evidence at all.
Would those who oppose the bill like it any better if instead of saying
the rule of evidence shall be thus and so the bill said that no govern-
mental agency shall use the fruits of its own crime? Would they like
it any better if it said, "No violator of a constitutional guarantee shall
profit by his violation"? That is not a rule of evidence, that is a rule
of substantive law. It goes back to the principles of equity embodied
in those maxims with which all lawyers are familiar: "No one shall
come into court with unclean hands," "no man shall profit from his
own crime." And it goes back beyond the rules of equity to basic prin-
ciples of morality and ethics. It is summarized in the statement
accepted by civilized society everywhere that the end does not justify
the means. Is that a rule of evidence?8
He then dealt with the judicial history of the rule of New York allowing
the receipt of evidence wrongfully obtained and turned to the adequacy of the
sanction proposed by the amendment before the Convention:
... and I think.., that this is the only effective sanction, and that
if this sanction is not adopted, the guarantee against illegal search
and seizure and the guarantee against wire-tapping without judicial
supervision are ineffective....
Now, recognizing that this is the only effective sanction, why
isn't it the proper sanction? Mr. Bruce tells us it is not the proper
sanction for this reason: that if two persons are involved in private
litigation, and one of them is guilty of some violation, the proper sanc-
tion is to penalize him, and not to confer a benefit upon the other.
As a proposition of civil law, I might have something to say in criticism
of that, ...
The fact is that we are not dealing with civil litigation between
man and man, we are dealing with the problem of the power of the
government against one man, we are dealing with the problem of the
majesty of the State of New York against a single defendant, and we
are dealing with a guarantee which is directed against the State of
New York in all its majesty.9
In precise detail he examined the whole problem in its historical develop-
ment. He ended with a plea of high eloquence resting on a view of long-term
statesmanship. Recognizing the perils to freedom that the 1930's had uncovered,
he begged the Convention "to go with me to a hill top and take a long-range
view of this question."10 He continued:
8. Id. at 546-47.
9. Id. at 549.
10. Id. at 553.
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We are writing a Constitution for a generation, it is for my gener-
ation, it is for the generation of many of us, it is for the generation
of the children of many of you. And I say to you that this generation is
in a much worse position than any generation in the history of our
country. This is a generation that is caught in a mad whirl, that is
destroying the basic decencies that make up civilization. And I care
not on how narrow an issue the conflict may arise, the issue is before
us. We, the pioneer State of this country, have a glorious opportunity
to vote, not on this narrow issue, but to vote on its implications, to
vote for the basic philosophy that stands for the other side. The two
philosophies can be very simply stated. There is one which would facili-
tate the growth of governmental power-that is the one which puts
first governmental convenience, which would even take care of lazy,
stupid, incompetent prosecutors and police.... And on the other side,
there is the philosophy that erects around every citizen and around the
home of every citizen an invisible barrier against which even the maj-
esty of the law is forbidden to trespass without proper judicial super-
vision.
And I appeal to you, ladies and gentlemen of the Convention, to
stand with me and to choose the philosophy that will mark New York
State as a forward-looking State, not as a State willing to go back,
back to the days of the King and the King's power to invade the home,
but a State which is going forward, foward to a new birth of freedom.1
It is noteworthy to see how accurately this argument looked a quarter of a
century ahead to embrace the view of the 1960's that basic constitutional rights
need the full sanction of judicial interdiction against violation if they are to be
truly effective and forecast the growth of this interdiction.
Again on the issue of the rights of an accused and again anticipating a
far greater pre-occupation with this problem in the 1960's than had been known
in the 1930's Halpern offered a proposal on the floor of the Convention which
would have thrown heavy protection around a person accused of crime against
confessions made while under arrest. He would have provided "that any state-
ment or confession made by a defendant while under arrest should not be
admitted into evidence unless the statement were made in open court or before
a grand jury or unless the protection afforded by the section was waived in
writing attested by counsel for the defendant."'
2
As "a substitute for the use of the private inquisition" he also proposed
that a person accused of crime could be brought before a magistrate and com-
pelled to submit to an examination after reasonable cause to believe him to
be guilty of a crime had been established. His refugal to answer could be used
against him. These two amendments were treated by him as "integrated
proposal."' 3
A powerful and compact argument was advanced. As to the first he argued:
As Judge Sears has indicated, one of the real problems in the
11. Id. at 553-54.
12. Id. at 1785.
13. Ibid.
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modern administration of criminal law is the problem which has come
to be known commonly as "The Third Degree." It is an interesting
historical fact that the privilege against self-incrimination which we
regard as so fundamental in our law, under the decisions in this and in
other states, protects the defendant only when he is in open court
in the presence of his friends and in the presence of his counsel. And
when the accused person really needs protection against the unsuper-
vised inquisition privately carried on by prosecuting officials, it is held
in all the courts that the privilege against self-incrimination does not
protect him. And if he is induced to make any incriminating statement,
it can be used against him upon the trial.... It seems to me if we are
to make the privilege against self-incrimination really effective it ought
to apply to the defendant before he is brought into the courtroom, as
well as thereafter.
14
As to the second part, compelling an examination before a magistrate, he
argued for the proposal that:
... It undertook to take the profit out of the third degree, by removing
one of its motives, one of the motives of the third degree being the
obtaining of a confession which can be introduced in evidence against
a defendant. Under the existing law, in every case, there has to be a
contest as to whether the confession was obtained by the use of force
or was truly voluntary in character. If we are really to protect the
defendant there should not be any question at all. The defendant is
under arrest; his counsel isn't present. He ought to be taken before a
Magistrate and asked to make a statement in open court, if he really
wants to make a voluntary statement, and if he does not want to make
one really voluntarily, then the statement under the law ought to be
considered for all purposes as involuntarily made, and therefore ex-
cluded.' 5
Perhaps his most eloquent plea before the Convention and certainly the
one which suggested the most thorough research and the most lawyer-like sum-
ming up, was against the proposal to add to the Judiciary Article as it had been
reported by the Judiciary Committee an amendment which would authorize
the courts to review judicial and quasi-judicial determinations of administrative
agencies on the facts as well as the law and when found by the court to be
"contrary to the evidence or not supported by the facts" to direct reconsid-
eration.' 6
This apparently innocuous provision split the Convention assunder. It
really represented the deep fear of the conservatives of the ever-enlarging scope
of power vested in administrative agencies and the concern that the "welfare
state" of large governmental bureaus would seriously impair traditional property
rights. Their hope of refuge was in the courts.
But the courts had been very wary about 'meddling with administrative
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Record, p. 3432.
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decisions-they had looked to see if they were supported by substantial evidence
and that was as far as they would go.
The liberal view in the Convention was that this proposal would emasculate
administrative agencies, turn back the hand of time, and in effect turn over
to the judges the vast and complicated task of handling administration of
government for which the judges were ill-prepared. The proposal was carried
in the Convention and became a part of the Judiciary Article submitted to
the people. But in the election of 1938 both political parties opposed the
adoption of the whole Judiciary Article because of this enlarged judicial review
and the article was defeated.
Halpern's opening words were characteristic of his stature in the Conven-
tion and of the strength and courage of his personal convictions: "I want to
appeal to my Republican brethren to think of this in terms of a problem of
government. . . .We ought not to rush it through tonight without giving it
the consideration it deserves."'17
In a few words he laid down the general problem created by the proposal.
"The government of the State of New York has been built up over a period
of over 50 years upon the basis of boards and officers and tribunals which
have combined within them functions which are partly judicial, partly legis-
lative and partly executive. . . .This proposal means, in the form that Mr.
Whalen has now presented it, that the government of the State of New York
will be transferred from the executive and legislative departments into the
courts; that the courts will undertake to administer the government of the
State of New York."' 8
Then, the habitual method of the carefully trained lawyer coming to bear,
he turned to the word "quasi-judicial" used in the amendment. He said:
And to go back for just a moment to the word "quasi-judicial,"
we get some idea what this proposal means.
A half dozen definitions have been introduced tonight of quasi-
judicial. The fact that the word "quasi" at this time cannot be defined
by anybody to anybody else's satisfaction indicates the nature of the
problem. You have all kinds of quasi-things, quasi-judicial, quasi-
legislative, quasi-executive. These various boards, officers and tribunals,
combine within them all these different functions; you cannot tear
them apart. You cannot say to the Insurance Department, we are
going to tear out all of the functions of your department that are
judicial. You cannot say to the Banking Department that whenever
you have to make a decision on evidence at a hearing we will tear
that out; that must go into court. You cannot say to the Conservation
Department and Agriculture and Markets and all the departments
that they may not pass on anything which involves a question to be
determined upon evidence.' 9
17. Id. at 2092.
18. Id. at 2097, 2094.
19. Id. at 2094.
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Then, turning from narrow and tight legal construction to the broader
avenues of public policy, he pursued his argument:
Now, if I have spoken with some heat about this matter, it is
because I have lived with it in the Convention for three or four months;
but not only that, I have lived with this problem for the many years
that I have been studying it, and I want to say to the lawyers and
judges who are members of this Convention please do not think of
this problem as a lawsuit, because it is not a lawsuit, and it is not a
question of the grievance of a particular client who did not like a de-
cision by a particular administrative body. It is a question of whether
we here in this Convention on the basis of three hour discussion are
going to tear apart the whole structure of the government of this
State 20
Eloquently he gave the warning that if this proposal were adopted it would
be rejected by the people and the whole work of the Convention lost:
Let me point out . . . if this proposal goes into the Constitution,
which I think means goes out of the window, because when the people
of this State are made aware of what we are doing in one night's
session, undermining the system of the government that we have had
for so many years in this State, not only this provision, but all of the
Constitution that goes with it will be lost.2 '
In all this serious discussion, and Halpern took active part in many ex-
changes and debates on these areas of constitutional law which engaged his
interest, there were occassional flashes of the rapid Halpern wit and good humor.
At one point he was opposing a proposal that if Congress incorporated a Federal
agency and freed it from taxation New York could not tax a similar State
agency, with the suggestion that the State should not "hobble" its own Legis-
lature. Chief Judge Crane, as president, had called time on his discussion and
another delegate (Mr. Pitcher) had yielded him five minutes of his time. 22
Finally there were several interruptions, at which the Chief Judge directed
"Sit down; sit down."2 3 Halpern, apparently thinking that this direction
included him, sat down before his time was up. As he tried to continue, he
was cut off by the Chief Judge with the remark: "I think you sat down volun-
tarily before your time was up. I was just going to compliment you on it."
To this came the rapid reply: "I took what your Honor intended for a smile
for a frown."1
2 4
One of the significant proposals by Halpern before the Convention which
became part of the Judiciary Article as proposed and was adopted was the
paragraph in Article I, section 6, that "The power of grand juries to inquire
into the willful misconduct in office of public officers and to find indictments
20. Id. at 2095.
21. Id. at 2095-96.
22. Id. at 2454.
23. Id. at 2456.
24. Id. at 2570.
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or to direct the filing of informations in connection with such inquiries shall
never be suspended or impaired by law."
He explained this succinctly:
* . The grand jury under statutes of this State is authorized to inquire
into the misconduct of public officials within the county in which the
grand jury sits, and there is a guarantee in the Constitution against
prosecution of any person for a felony without the indictment of grand
jury. However, there is no guarantee in the Constitution of the right
of a grand jury and of the power of a grand jury to investigate the
misconduct of public officials ...
The function of grand juries in the investigation of the misconduct
of public officials is one of the most important functions served by the
grand jury system today. The existence of an independent agency
drawn from the citizenry at large for that purpose is one of the most
estimable features of the American system of government. It has served
well. Recent experience has demonstrated that although it has been
with us for over a century and a half, and before that, in a modified
form, as part of the English system, it is not beyond the reach of legis-
lative interference. And the purpose of this amendment is to protect, at
least, that function of the grand jury against legislative interference.25
These references embrace a mere sample of a truly remarkable total contri-
bution by Philip Halpern to the work of the Convention. His restless energy
and wide and responsive interests covered the broadest possible range of consti-
tutional problems. He made a significant contribution to the work of the
Convention. He brought to bear at once a lawyer's skill of the highest order
and a far-sighted view of the public welfare in the highest tradition of the State.
FRANCIS BERGAN, Associate Judge
New York Court of Appeals
25. Id. at 2570-71.
